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ENDANGERED DEFERENCE: SEPARATION
OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
AGENCY INTERPRETATION
KATHRYN M. BALDWIN †
INTRODUCTION
Donald Zarda, a skydiving instructor, did what he was paid
to do: put a client at ease when tensions were running high
before a big jump. For Zarda, that meant disclosing he was gay
to a female client whose boyfriend was teasing her about being
closely strapped to a man. 1 The boyfriend called Zarda’s
employer to complain, and Zarda was subsequently fired. 2 Zarda
filed a complaint alleging, among other things, that he was fired
for discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, bound by its precedent in Simonton v. Runyon, 4
affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the
While the Supreme Court has
employer on that claim. 5
established a Title VII claim for “discrimination based on a
failure to conform to ‘sex stereotypes,’ ” 6 it has not recognized a
“ ‘sex stereotype’ that men should date women.” 7 Based on the
anomalous logic that a plaintiff alleging discrimination could
prevail if she were a masculine woman but not if she were a

†
Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2018, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A., Xavier University. With thanks to Professor Anita
Krishnakumar for her support and invaluable insight and to the editorial board for
their diligent and thorough work.
1
Joseph Goldstein, Discrimination Based on Sex Is Debated in Case of Gay Sky
Diver, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/nyregion
/discrimination-based-on-sex-sky-diver-donald-zarda.html.
2
Id.
3
Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2018)).
4
232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation).
5
Zarda, 855 F.3d at 79–80 (noting that a three-judge panel cannot overturn
Second Circuit precedent).
6
Id. at 80 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)).
7
Id. at 81.
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masculine woman who is also a lesbian, the Second Circuit
granted a rehearing en banc to revisit the question of whether
the term “sex” encompasses sexual orientation. 8
At the rehearing, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), the agency charged with enforcing the
Civil Rights Act, argued that Title VII’s prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. 9 The agency first established this
position in Baldwin v. Foxx, 10 which was decided during the
pendency of Zarda’s case and formed the basis for his appeal. 11
Using its unique vantage point to adjudicate anti-discrimination
hearings across the country, the EEOC construed a notoriously
ambiguous statute to fulfill its congressionally delegated duty.
The Second Circuit’s en banc decision in Zarda cited the evolved
position the EEOC took in the Baldwin case, and adopted its
framework and analysis to hold that Title VII discrimination on
the basis of sex includes sexual orientation. 12
This is a critical issue to resolve, as states vary widely in
their protections for LGBTQ workers, resulting in confusion and
insecurity for employees. 13 As the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have reached
divergent definitions of “sex,” 14 the Second Circuit’s en banc
interpretation reinforces a circuit split that primes the issue for
eventual certification to the United States Supreme Court.
While the Second Circuit found statutory protection for the
LGBTQ workforce, its refusal to explicitly state that it was

Braden Campbell, 2nd Circ. Grants En Banc Rehearing on Gay Bias
Precedent, LAW 360 (May 25, 2017, 7:50 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles
/928578/2nd-circ-grants-en-banc-rehearing-on-gay-bias-precedent.
9
Goldstein, supra note 1 (noting that the Department of Justice argued against
this reading).
10
EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (July 15, 2015).
11
Zarda, 855 F.3d at 81.
12
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15–3775, slip op., at 8, 12–13, 21 (2d Cir,
Feb. 26, 2018) (en banc).
13
See German Lopez, The Equality Act, the Most Comprehensive LGBTQ Rights
Act Ever, Explained, VOX (Nov. 10, 2015, 6:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/
7/23/9023611/equality-act-lgbt-rights.
14
Compare Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 350–51 (7th
Cir. 2017) (“It would require considerable calisthenics to remove the ‘sex’ from
‘sexual orientation.’ ”), with Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255–57
(11th Cir. 2017) (denying a claim under Title VII for discrimination based on sexual
orientation).
8
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persuaded by, or deferring to, the EEOC’s position was a missed
opportunity to shed critical light on who is best positioned to
interpret statutes: agencies or courts. 15
Agencies set and enforce a wide variety of rules and
regulations that bring the federal government inside the homes
of Americans, affecting everything from our paychecks to our
prescriptions to the foods in our pantries. Since the inception of
administrative agencies, courts and legislators have wrestled
with agencies’ proper role in government, and how to
appropriately cabin the scope of agency power.
For over thirty years, courts have deferred to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute through the
framework of the Chevron doctrine.
Subsequent judicial
decisions have complicated this doctrine 16 and questioned
whether it amounts to a constitutional violation of separation of
Adding fuel to the fire is the bipartisan
powers. 17
acknowledgment that the executive branch under President
Obama expanded its authority, either to circumvent a gridlocked
Congress, 18 to further the President’s own agenda, 19 or both. As
15
Of note, the EEOC did not argue for deference to the agency’s position in its
amici brief to the Second Circuit, sitting en banc. See En Banc Brief Amicus Curiae
of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants
and Reversal, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2017) (No. 15-3775).
16
See Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Chevron on the
Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 171–72
(2012) (noting complications in the doctrine, categorical limitations in application,
and a decline in its overall application).
17
See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713–14 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“As in other areas of our jurisprudence concerning administrative
agencies . . . we seem to be straying further and further from the Constitution
without so much as pausing to ask why.”).
18
See Sandra Zellmer, Treading Water While Congress Ignores the Nation's
Environment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2323, 2384 (2013) (“When Congress is
dysfunctional, the other branches of government tend to fill the vacuum.”).
19
See, e.g., Emma Brown, Bipartisan Group of Senators Asks Obama to Rein in
Education Department Proposals, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2016/11/03/senators-from-both-parties-askobama-to-rein-in-education-department-proposals/?utm_term=.af9ec36d6881
(Senators argued Obama-era regulations from the Education Department would
undermine their goal of shifting power back to the states); Rebekah Mintzer, Obama
Administration Champions Pay Equity, But Some Allege Overreach, NAT’L L.J. (Oct.
24, 2016, 5:50 AM), http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/10/21/obama-administra
tion-champions-pay-equity-but-some-allege-overreach/?slreturn=20161030135154;
Alan Gomez, Obama Immigration Plan Will Challenge Agency, Applicants, USA
TODAY (Dec. 1, 2014, 3:45 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014
/12/01/obama-immigra
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further evidence of Chevron’s growing unpopularity, Congress is
considering a bill that would overturn agency deference. In
January 2017, the House passed a bill including the Separation
of Powers Restoration Act (“SOPRA”) to curtail agency authority
by eliminating agency deference, shifting the primacy of
statutory interpretation to courts through de novo review of
agency construction. 20
This Note argues in defense of deference. From a separation
of powers perspective, this Note argues first that Congress
should rely on its other legislative checks over agency
rulemaking and interpretation rather than legislating a blanket
standard of judicial review. This Note next argues that while
overruling Chevron is within the Supreme Court’s ambit, it
should decline to do so.
A de novo review of agency
interpretations would create its own separation of powers issues,
and would destabilize the predictable backdrop against which
lower courts, Congress, and agencies have operated for more
than three decades. Instead, the Court should incorporate postenactment legislative history as an indication of congressional
intent, closely mirroring the agency’s own understanding of
Congress’s will, and redistributing some interpretive power to
Congress.
This Note proceeds in four parts: Part I consists of a brief
history21 of the development of agency deference doctrine. Part II
examines the decline of deference from the perspective of all
three branches of government: the overuse by the executive
agency that catalyzed deference’s denouement, the underuse by
the United States Supreme Court and renewed separation of

tion-executive-action-preparations/19544657/; JAMES E. MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA
COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41561, EPA REGULATIONS: TOO MUCH, TOO
LITTLE, OR ON TRACK? (2016) (citing bipartisan criticism towards regulations
promulgated by the EPA under the Obama Administration).
20
See infra Part II.C.
21
As Chevron is one of the most discussed cases in academic writing, only a
broad summary of its origin is necessary. See Peter M. Shane & Christopher J.
Walker, Symposium, 30 Years of Chevron: Looking Back and Looking Forward,
Foreword, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 (2014) (“Chevron has been cited in over
68,000 total sources available on Westlaw—including in over 13,500 subsequent
judicial decisions, in over 41,000 court filings, and in nearly 12,000 law review
articles and secondary sources.”); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612,
613 (1996) (“Chevron deference has preoccupied administrative law scholarship in a
way few issues ever have.”).
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powers challenges, and the parallel assault from Congress under
the pending SOPRA. Part III addresses the proposed de novo
review standard and highlights the deficiencies in that solution,
emphasizing instead the tools that Congress already employs to
meaningfully check agency interpretations. Part IV concludes
with a suggestion to courts to better balance separation of powers
not through de novo review, but by embracing congressional
intent as exhibited in post-enactment legislative history.
I.

DEFERENCE DEVELOPS WITH THE EXPANSION OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Agency rulemaking powers, including rules that interpret
and construe statutory terms, are derivative powers, predicated
on a grant of authority from Congress. The Administrative
Procedure Act outlines the scope of judicial review of agency
decisions, including interpretive rulemaking. 22 Pursuant to this
review, a court may “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right.” 23 Thus, where an agency’s construction of a statutory
term exceeds the limits or language of the statute, the court may
invalidate the agency’s rule. If, however, Congress has expressly
or impliedly left a gap for the agency to fill, it has not exceeded
its delegated authority by filling in those gaps. While “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is,” 24 courts incorporate the agency’s reasoned
construction and expertise into their judicial review.
The Supreme Court first heeded an agency’s statutory
Focusing on the
interpretation in Skidmore v. Swift. 25
administrator’s expertise, the Court gave “weight” 26 to
administrative rulings, interpretations, and opinions based on
the following factors: thoroughness, logic, consistency, and

See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).
Id. § 706(2)(C).
24
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
25
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
26
Peter Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron
Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012).
22
23
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persuasiveness. 27 Ultimately, the Skidmore Court held that
administrative rulings should “guide applications for
enforcement,” but were not “conclusive” or binding on the
Court. 28
Forty years later, the Court changed agency interpretation
doctrine by announcing a new deference regime that built on
In
Skidmore’s inclination for favoring agency expertise. 29
Chevron v. National Resource Defense Council, 30 the Court
reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”)
construction of the term “stationary source” for equipment that
produces emissions pursuant to the EPA’s mandate to regulate
air pollution under the Clean Air Act. 31 The Court developed a
two-part test for judicial review of agency statutory
construction. 32 First, where “Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue,” its “unambiguously expressed intent”
controls. 33 If, however, Congress is “silent or ambiguous,” then
the Court must determine if the agency’s interpretation “is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.” 34 The agency in
question need not be the only body interpreting the statute, nor
does the Court need to independently reach the same reading; if
the statute is silent or ambiguous, the agency’s reasonable
interpretation governs. 35
When Chevron solidified an agency’s interpretative primacy
over statutes, it directly addressed separation of powers
concerns. The Court expressed its intent to avoid deciding
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
Id. at 139.
29
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 980 (1992) (describing Chevron as “a significant shift in the deference doctrine,”
but stopping short of a “complete revolution”). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098 (2008)
(“[T]he Chevron regime . . . plays a surprisingly modest role in the Court’s deference
jurisprudence.”); Shane & Walker, supra note 21, at 494 (noting the “big deal” effect
of Chevron is most notable outside of the courts).
30
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
31
Id. at 840. The EPA’s rule provided for a “bubble” that included the entire
plant within the stationary source, which environmental groups challenged as being
too lenient on polluters. See id. The Court of Appeals set aside the regulation, and
“adopt[ed] a static judicial definition of the term ‘stationary source’ when it had
decided that Congress itself had not commanded that definition.” Id. at 842.
32
Id. at 842–43.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 843.
35
Id. at 843 n.11
27
28
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among permissible interpretations based on “competing political
interests,” stating that the Executive Branch is the appropriate
actor to make policy decisions because the President, unlike the
judiciary, is “directly accountable to the people.” 36 Federal
judges, having no constituency, should “respect legitimate policy
choices” of the actors who do. 37 Chevron pivoted towards
dynamic statutory interpretation as a necessary outgrowth of the
modern administrative state and extended Skidmore to its logical
conclusion: heed the wisdom of expert, political actors who create
technical rules to interpret and properly administer increasingly
complex laws. 38 Chevron cemented itself as the dominant
doctrine to guide statutory interpretation in an increasingly
agency-driven government, 39 as the growing complexity and
technicality of the administrative state requires an executivelegislative blend to nimbly create and enforce the rules,
guidelines, and regulations for a functioning modern
government.
II. DEFERENCE IN DANGER AND THE PIVOT TOWARDS DE NOVO
REVIEW
This Part examines deference’s destiny from three
perspectives. First, it analyzes the Obama administration’s
increased use of executive authority and robust agency action
that perhaps catalyzed the other branches’ rebuke of agency
deference. Next, it looks at the United States Supreme Court’s
underutilization of deference doctrines and the growing chorus of
criticism. Finally, this Part discusses Congress’s reaction to a
perceived power shift among the branches by proposing SOPRA.
A.

Executive Expansion of Agency Action

The growing presidential reliance on the administrative
state contextualizes the Court’s and Congress’s changing
Id. at 865–66.
Id. at 866.
38
Deference to expertise is neither novel nor exclusive to administrative law.
For example, the Business Judgment Rule recognizes a lack of institutional
confidence in the judiciary compared to the expertise of a director on a corporate
board. The Business Judgment Rule is a judicial presumption deferring to a decision
made by the board of directors of a corporation acting within their authority, so long
as the directors have acted in accord with their fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and
good faith. See Schlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776, 778–80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
39
The cracks in the foundation will be addressed infra Part II.
36
37
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response to agency deference. Bureaucratic control described as
the “administrative presidency” dates back to the Reagan
administration. 40 Each modern administration has developed
different tactics for maximizing executive control over agencies. 41
In particular, President Obama exercised a robust executive
authority to make significant policy changes outside of the
One explanation for
purview of the legislative branch. 42
President Obama’s amplified agency and executive rulemaking is
the ineffectiveness of the gridlocked Congress in office during
most of his tenure. An entrenched, partisan Congress is unable
to form the necessary level of consensus on potentially
controversial or broad policy and lacks the political will and votes
to pass legislation drafted with specificity. 43 To accomplish policy
reform, the Obama administration circumvented the legislative
process to offer rules on climate change, 44 immigration, 45 and
civil rights issues. 46
Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative
Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 577
(2011).
41
Id. at 605–07 (describing President Reagan’s strategy, later adopted by
President George W. Bush, to fill agency appointments and restructured positions to
“alter[ ] the career-appointee balance in many agencies,” while the Clinton
Administration inserted White House staff into regulatory review and exerted
pressure on agency heads to promulgate rules that conform with presidential policy
choices (quoting DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS:
POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 52 (2008))).
42
Supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
43
Cf. Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the
Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 208 (2013) (“Polarization is
already leading to an increase in the power of the Court against Congress, whether
or not the Justices affirmatively seek that additional power.”).
44
Coral Davenport, Obama Plans New Rule to Limit Water Pollution, N.Y.
TIMES (May 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/23/us/politics/obama-set-tostrengthen-federal-role-in-clean-water-regulation.html?_r=0 (“The water rule is part
of a broader push by President Obama to use his executive authority to build a
major environmental legacy, without requiring new legislation from the Republicancontrolled Congress.”).
45
See Gomez, supra note 19.
46
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div. & U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague
Letter on Transgender Students (May 13, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa
/file/850986/download (announcing that the term “sex” in Title IX legislation, schools
receiving federal funding must allow students to use restrooms “consistent with
their gender identity”). The Trump administration is similarly frustrated by
congressional stalemates, and continues to use executive orders and agency
decisions to circumvent stalled or failed legislative action, most notably in the
synthetic repeal of the Affordable Care Act. Robert Pear, Maggie Haberman, & Reed
Abelson, Trump to Scrap Critical Healthcare Subsidies, Hitting Obamacare Again,
40
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Some critics argue that President Obama, assuming
deference to agency action, took advantage of the doctrine to
expand executive branch influence and policy-making control. 47
Importantly, the polarization of political parties affects agency
oversight shared between Congress and the President. 48 Leaders
on both sides of the aisle take umbrage with the increase in
power of the executive branch during the Obama
administration, 49 yet it is predominantly right-wing members of
Congress 50 and Republican-appointed justices on the Supreme
Court 51 who criticize and rally against the aggrandizement of
agency authority. Against this backdrop of increased executive
branch action, deference meets its downfall in the other two
branches.
B. The Court Cools on Deference Without Overturning Chevron
or Auer
The Supreme Court fails to exercise deference when
appropriate, applying Chevron to just one in four eligible cases,
whittling down the interpretive domain of agencies. 52 The series
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/politics/trumpobamacare-executive-order-health-insurance.html.
47
Binyamin Appelbaum & Michael D. Shear, How the President Came to
Embrace Executive Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2016, at A1 (“[H]is exercise of
administrative power expanded and cemented a domestic legacy that now rivals
Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society in reach and scope.”). This is a large departure
from early agency action, where President Obama issued executive orders to
streamline agencies and reduce administrative redundancy, and called on federal
agencies to use behavioral science to become more practical and effective. See Cass
R. Sunstein, Making Government Logical, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20 2015, at 9(L).
48
See Michael A. Livermore, Political Parties and Presidential Oversight, 67
ALA. L. REV. 45, 97 (2015). For example, President Obama’s controversial use of
recess appointments likely influenced the erosion of Congress’s trust in agency
decisions, as legislators were threatened by the loss of a key oversight opportunity.
See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2555–56 (2014).
49
Appelbaum & Shear, supra note 47 (“The administration’s regulatory legacy
has become an issue in the campaign to replace Mr. Obama. . . . ”).
50
See David Hawkings, Article One: The Right’s Recipe for a Hill Revival, CQ
MAG., Apr. 4, 2016.
51
See infra notes 65–74 and accompanying text.
52
See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1293, 1300 (2016) (describing the inconsistencies of the Court in applying Chevron).
The Court applies Auer even less frequently, affording deference “in a mere 7.1% of
eligible cases.” Eskridge & Baer, supra note 29, at 1104 (covering Court decisions
from 1984–2006). See also Kevin M. Stack, The Interpretive Dimension of Seminole
Rock, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 670 (2015). This dearth of deference might be
explained by an overlap of available doctrines, including Chevron, but most Auer-
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of exceptions limiting the application of Chevron deference has
crippled the doctrine’s legitimacy and use, and contrary to its
original purpose, has created an unpredictable body of law.
Three considerations explain why the Court decides not to
defer to agency construction of ambiguous statutes or
regulations. First, exceptions are often based on the formal
process of rule-making. 53 The scholar-termed “Chevron Step
Zero” ignores an agency’s construction when it lacks the “force of
law” or was the product of informal procedures. 54 Second, the
Court recognizes the spectrum of complexity or technicality
among statutes and rewards agencies interpreting technical
statutes based on expertise necessarily beyond the Court’s
institutional ken. 55 Further, some enabling statutes explicitly
prescribe the standard of judicial review, leaving less room for
courts to defer to agency decisionmakers. 56 Finally, politics could
explain the inconsistencies in whether Chevron is applied and,
when it is, which agency interpretations are upheld. Arguably,
the selective application of deference is a proper check on
politicized agency rule-making. 57 Realistically, ideological voting
plagues Supreme Court administrative case law. 58 It is very

eligible cases are afforded no deference at all. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 29, at
1104. Compare Eskridge & Baer, supra note 28, at 1125, with Kent Barnett &
Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1, 32 (2017)
(“[C]ircuit courts applied the Chevron framework in . . . 74.8%[ o]f interpretations,
[and] the agency prevailed . . . 77.4% [of the time].”).
53
See Barnett & Walker, supra note 51, at 14 (citing Lisa Schultz Bressman,
How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443,
1449–50 (2005)).
54
See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 218 (2006);
Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 756–
57 (2014).
55
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 29, at 1144–45 (noting that at the Supreme
Court level, energy and intellectual property interpretations prevail 93.3% and
88.2% of the time, respectively, closely followed by foreign affairs and national
security, bankruptcy, business regulation, tax, and entitlement programs, whereas
civil rights interpretations succeed only 61.0% of the time).
56
See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2015)
(describing how Congress reacted to preemption decisions by the Office of
Comptroller of the Currency by setting a specific, lower level of Skidmore deference
in the Dodd-Frank Act to show it had lost confidence and respect for the agency).
57
See Pierce, supra note 52, at 1309.
58
See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 29, at 1156 (noting in an empirical study a
pronounced agreement-rate differential based on liberal or conservative agency
interpretations, where “the best indicator of whether the agency will win in any
given case is the ideological characterization of the agency interpretation”).
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likely that the Court splits along ideological lines deciding a
policy decision on the merits, then works backwards to determine
whether application of deference supports the end result. 59
The re-emergence of the “Major Question Doctrine” in King v.
Burwell 60 is a paradigmatic example of how a politicized Court
approaches Chevron. The Major Question Doctrine declines to
apply Chevron deference for significant policy questions. 61 In
King, the Court stated that the availability of tax credits for
federally established exchanges under the Affordable Care Act
was “a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that
is central to this statutory scheme” not meant for the IRS to
interpret without an express assignment from Congress. 62 Even
without applying Chevron, the Court ultimately agreed with the
IRS’s construction, 63 leading critics to believe that the Court
needlessly jettisoned the doctrine while achieving the endsfocused result it intended all along. 64
Background policy preferences may have led four members of
the Court to entertain the idea of overturning some aspect of
agency deference during President Obama’s tenure.
Chief
Justice Roberts first questioned agency deference as a violation of
separation of powers in a dissenting opinion for City of Arlington
v. FCC. 65 In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized the

59
See Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How
Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV.
779, 839 (2010).
60
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
61
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125–26 (2000);
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 220 (1994).
62
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
63
Id. at 2496.
64
See Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions About the "Major Questions" Doctrine, 5
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479, 498–99 (2016); Vanessa L. Johnson, Marisa Finley
& J. James Rohack, King v. Burwell: The Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity to
Cure What Ails Chevron, 42 J. LEGIS. 101, 131–32 (2016); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, SCOTUS Gets Another Look at the Affordable Care Act, ABA JOURNAL
(Feb. 25, 2015, 9:15 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerisnky_
scotus_gets_another_look_at_the_affordable_care_act
(noting
the
correlation
between partisan appointment and lower court judges’ determination of whether to
uphold the Affordable Care Act).
65
569 U.S. 290, 312 (2013) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting); See Andrew M.
Grossman, City of Arlington v. FCC: Justice Scalia's Triumph, CATO SUP. CT. REV.
331, 332 (2013). In City of Arlington, state and local governments challenged a
declaratory ruling issued by the FCC that limited their authority for zoning wireless
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need for judicial authority against an unruly and allencompassing administrative state. 66 Nevertheless, the majority
opinion of the Court upheld the agency’s ruling, applied Chevron,
and declined to grapple with questions raised in the case about
the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction. 67 The majority even went
so far as to describe de novo review as “an invitation to make an
ad hoc judgment regarding congressional intent.” 68
Justice Thomas has also questioned agency deference,
writing separately in Michigan v. EPA 69 to directly challenge the
constitutionality of Chevron deference. 70 In Perez v. Mortgage
Bankers Ass’n, 71 he argued that deference to agency decisions
“undermines [the Court’s] obligation to provide a judicial check
on the other branches, and it subjects regulated parties to
precisely the abuses that the Framers sought to prevent.” 72 In
the same case, Justice Scalia indicated a willingness to overturn
the Seminole Rock or Auer doctrine affording deference to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, 73 and Justice Alito
also indicated his interest in reviewing the constitutionality of
the Auer doctrine, though not on the facts of that case. 74 In the
last five years, conservative Justices have planted seeds of doubt
about the prudence and constitutionality of deference, and their
congressional counterparts are harvesting them, intent on
dismantling the primacy of agency interpretation.

telecommunication antennae and tower sites, claiming the ruling was outside the
bounds of the FCC’s statutory authority. 569 U.S. at 294–95 (majority opinion).
66
City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 313–15 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that
presidential oversight is not enough to keep agencies in check and warning against
“the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state”).
67
Id. at 304 (majority opinion) (noting that forcing a jurisdictional question is
an attack not on the agency’s authority, but rather “the ultimate target . . . is
Chevron itself”).
68
Id. at 307.
69
135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
70
Id. at 2713–14.
71
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
72
Id. Although that decision focused on interpretations of agency regulations,
Chevron is necessarily implicated in the broad sweep of Justice Thomas’s
constitutional concerns. See id. at 1217.
73
Id. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The agency is free to interpret its own
regulations with or without notice and comment; but courts will decide—with no
deference to the agency—whether that interpretation is correct.”).
74
Id. at 1210–11 (Alito, J., concurring).
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C. Congress Seeks to Legislate the Standard of Review for the
Court
Like the Court, the efforts to override deference from
Congress are driven by conservatives making a broad push to
enhance the power of the legislature. 75 While this might be
consistent with party ideology to deregulate and shrink the
federal government, it is impossible to ignore that the political
underpinnings of a hegemonic struggle are a driving force behind
a congressional body with obstructionist tendencies. 76
Unwilling to wait for the Court to overturn Chevron and
Auer, members of Congress seek to achieve the same end by
mandating a judicial standard of de novo review for all matters of
agency interpretation in SOPRA. 77 At the start of the new term,
SOPRA was repackaged as Title II of The Regulatory
Accountability Act of 2017, which passed in the House in
January 2017. 78
The House Judiciary Committee Report on SOPRA 79
emphasizes the importance of democratic accountability and calls
on members of Congress to sharpen their writing in arms against
a runaway administrative state. In explaining the need for
SOPRA, legislators argue that agency deference is a “slippery
slope” that will lead to uncertainty in the law based on the
whims of agency interpretations. 80 They further argue that the
effect of deference is bad for Congress’s accountability in writing
comprehensive and clear statutes, noting that “the modern
administrative state is characterized by poor and gauzy
legislation in which gaps and ambiguities are too often left
intentionally by Congress, to be filled by unaccountable agency
75
See Hawkings, supra note 49 (describing the fear that “Congress has become
the dullest point on the federal triangle” as animating the group’s initiatives).
76
See 163 CONG. REC. H324 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 2017) (statement of Rep.
Goodlatte) (remarking that “[t]he Obama Administration abused regulation to force
its will on the American people” and that regulatory reform, including SOPRA,
would give the incoming Trump Administration the “tools” to end “abusive
regulation”).
77
H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016).
78
H.R. 5, 115th Cong. § 202 (2017) (proposing amendments to 5 U.S.C. § 706).
The following July, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced the Separation of Powers
Restoration Act of 2017 to the Senate. S. 1577, 115th Cong. (2017).
79
STAFF OF H. JUDICIARY COMM., 114TH CONG., REP. ON SEPARATION OF
POWERS RESTORATION ACT OF 2016 (Comm. Print 2016).
80
Id. at 4.
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officials, whose work in turn is facilitated by deference from
unaccountable judges.” 81 The report does not address how de
novo review will encourage better drafting from Congress. 82
Also absent from the committee report, but likely not from
drafters’ minds, is the concern that Chevron could unfairly
heighten the hurdle for statutory abrogation. When a court
exercising interpretive primacy construes a statute contrary to
Congress’s intent, Congress can amend or legislate around the
decision. 83 By contrast, when a court upholds an agency’s
unintended interpretation, any corrective legislation would be
more likely to face presidential veto for the sake of consistent
policies within the executive branch, effectively requiring a
super-majority to override both the misinterpretation and veto, 84
further insulating the agency’s interpretation from oversight.
Even fully crediting Congress’s concerns as accurately identifying
the weaknesses of deference doctrines, their proposed solution, de
novo review, will only exacerbate these problems.
III. DE NOVO REVIEW IS NOT AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION
It is unlikely that either the Regulatory Reform Act of 2017
or SOPRA will be enacted. 85 Regardless of their viability, this
Note will proceed to examine why de novo review, which the
United States Supreme Court could impose by overturning
Chevron, is ill-suited for agency interpretations. First, Congress
has other legislative powers to check agency overreach. Second,
de novo review would undermine the ideologies behind
81
Id. at 5. Ironically, the bill would cut out the middleman, leaving the
statutory interpretation up to “unaccountable judges” alone. As discussed supra
notes 36–38, democratic accountability was a primary concern of the Chevron Court.
82
Nor does the Committee Report acknowledge any of the necessities of vague
drafting, including bounded rationality and the difficulties of compromise across a
staggeringly deep partisan divide.
83
See Vikram David Amar, Chevron Deference and the Proposed “Separation of
Powers Restoration Act of 2016”: A Sign of the Times, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Jul. 26,
2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/07/26/chevron-deference-proposed-separationpowers-restoration-act-2016-sign-times.
84
See id.
85
Even in a single-party controlled government, PredictGov estimates the bill
has a 45% chance of being enacted. GOVTRACK, H.R. 5: Regulatory Accountability Act
of 2017, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr5 (last visited March 18, 2018).
Additionally, similar attempts to set blanket standards of review have failed. See
Barnett, supra note 56, at 52. (“Congress’s failure to pass a judicial-review statute of
general application since the APA in 1946 suggests that an omnibus statutory
response is unlikely to succeed.”).
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separation of powers. Finally, deference doctrines are functional
and relied upon by lower courts, Congress, and agencies, and
should be maintained for consistency and predictability of law.
A.

Congress Can Achieve Agency Oversight Through Legislative
Action

SOPRA is unnecessary to achieve congressional oversight
over administrative agencies, as Congress has both ex ante and
ex post means to limit agency overreach. Ex ante, Congress
could draft legislation with greater specificity, delineating agency
authority and designating the level of judicial review on a ruleby-rule or agency-by-agency basis. 86 Yet given the realities of
current drafting practices, including an increased use of omnibus
legislation, 87 the need to reconcile committees and drafters with
divergent interests, 88 and the effect of the budget score in
allowing ambiguity to prevail in a given statute, 89 relying on
Congress to draft statutes with enhanced precision seems an
unlikely, if not impossible, solution. Instead, Congress develops
a robust and descriptive legislative history for agencies to use as
an interpretive tool as they construe their delegated authority. 90
However, these solutions fail to influence agency interpretation
of prior enacted statutes or an agency’s own rules and guidelines.
For those issues, Congress turns to its ex post administrative
oversight powers.

86
See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013) (“Congress knows to
speak in plain terms when it wishes to circumscribe, and in capacious terms when it
wishes to enlarge, agency discretion.”); see also Barnett, supra note 56, at 53
(arguing for a systematic codification of judicial review for already-existing statutes
in reauthorization and appropriations bills).
87
Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:
Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 761 (2013) (“[T]he use of [this] ‘unorthodox’ vehicle[ ]
is on the rise and . . . the rise is attributable to increased polarization.”).
88
Id. at 756.
89
Id. at 764.
90
See Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An
Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 716 (2014) (showing agency
awareness and use of legislative histories in statutory interpretation); Kevin M.
Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109
NW. U. L. REV. 871, 884 (2015) (arguing that because agencies participate in drafting
legislative histories, they are more acutely aware of the drafting process and thus
better equipped to utilize legislative histories than courts).
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Congress cabins agency overreach and encourages agency
interpretations to conform to Congressional intent through three
powers. 91 First, and most potent, Congress exercises the power of
Congress signals its
the purse through appropriations. 92
interpretive preferences to agencies using appropriations in three
ways: passing riders and earmarks, 93 enacting authorizing
legislation, 94 and reducing the overall budget of the agency.95
Some agencies are statutorily established to be self-funded and,
therefore, are outside of Congress’s budgetary control. 96 As such,
the legislature—specifically the Senate—would have to rely on
its second tool, the appointment process, to vet agency leaders on
specific policy positions and send a strong prescriptive signal to
the President on those policies. 97 Appointments are a less
effective means of control than the budget, as they theoretically
occur less frequently than annual appropriations bills, and are a
speculative and unpredictable way to determine future agency
action. 98 Third, Congress can use both formal processes, such as
91
For a comprehensive analysis of Congress’s active participation in
administering laws, see generally Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration,
43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006).
92
See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1; id. art. I § 9, cl. 7; Note, Independence,
Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The Impact of
Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV L. REV 1822,
1825 (2012) (“Agencies are entirely dependent upon Congress . . . for funding.”).
93
Note, supra note 92, at 1826 (explaining that riders, which the Court treats
like legislation, prohibit the use of funding for specific purposes, and are “temporary,
narrowly focused amendments to the underlying statute,” while earmarks
specifically designate funding).
94
Charles Tiefer, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration and
Congressional Procedure, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 199, 200 (1998) (“[M]ost federal
agencies pay constant attention to their authorizing and appropriating committees,
and they do very little of significance without clearing—or at least informing—the
relevant committees.” (quoting T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Non-Judicial Checks on
Agency Actions 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 193, 195 (1997))).
95
See Note, supra note 92, at 1827–28 (noting that while it is possible for the
President to exercise control over the budget, using a veto to get more money for an
agency is a weak power).
96
See id. at 1823–24.
97
See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2; Developments in the Law—Presidential
Authority, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2135 (2012); Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments,
Innovation, and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 DUKE L.J. 1607, 1625–26 (2015).
98
Cf. Ian Ostrander, Senate Democrats are Battling Every Trump Nomination.
Here’s How That Can Hurt Trump’s Policies, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/15/senatedemocrats-are-battling-every-trump-nomination-heres-how-that-hurt-trumpspolicies/?utm_term=.46b9043e8117 (arguing that delaying appointments has a large
effect on an agency’s ability to execute its policy aims).
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oversight hearings 99 and committee reports, and informal
contacts and statements to indicate its preference towards
specific policies. 100
Congress, of course, already employs these tactics. For
example, legislators have used budget cuts, riders to
appropriation bills, and Senate refusal to confirm a permanent
director to prevent the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (“ATF”) from carrying out specific policy goals, such as
creating a federal registry for firearm transactions. 101 Congress
has effectively hamstrung the ATF with a combination of
exclusively legislative actions, underscoring the power of the
legislative branch to oversee agency decision making. 102
However, where Congress remains unsatisfied with the
discretion exercised by the agency after it has exhausted all of its
opportunities to influence the executive branch, judicial review is
its last hope.
B. Deference Serves Separation of Powers Interests
De novo review strays further away from the goals of
separation of powers by shifting policy-making power to the
judiciary, effectively subverting democratic accountability and
undermining the economic exercise of judicial authority. In
Chevron, the Court emphasized the necessity of allowing
agencies and administrators who are beholden to the President,
an officer elected by the entire country, to make policies. 103 Some
critics argue that presidential oversight delegitimizes agency
choices. 104 If the electorate is dissatisfied with the way the

99
See Brian D. Feinstein, Avoiding Oversight: Legislator Preferences and
Congressional Monitoring of the Administrative State, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 23, 28,
42 (2011) (arguing that oversight hearings are an important, legitimate, and
effective way to elicit a change in bureaucratic response post-hearing).
100
Beermann, supra note 91, at 70 (“All of the informal congressional action
directed at agencies takes place in the context of (often unspoken) threats that
Congress (or a particularly powerful member or committee) will not cooperate with
the executive branch in the future.”).
101
Erica Goode & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Legal Curbs Said to Hamper A.T.F. in
Gun Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/26/
us/legislative-handcuffs-limit-atfs-ability-to-fight-gun-crime.html.
102
See id. (noting that the NRA encouraged Congress to take these actions).
103
Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
104
See Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President's Statutory Authority
over Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2479–80 (2011) (noting the opacity of
the White House’s policy decision-making process).
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President and agency develop policies, the Court conscientiously
chose deference to prioritize political accountability, something
that federal judges with lifetime appointments lack by design.
Interpretation is an inherently political task, as it affects
substantive policy outcomes.
Where critics of deference argue that agency deference
aggrandizes executive branch power at the expense of Congress,
a shift to de novo review similarly expands judicial power by
ensuring a branch purportedly unable to make policy decisions in
effect controls policy outcomes. This judicial power-grab is most
obvious in the Major Question Doctrine. Rather than defer to
agency decisions, judges make policy choices in de novo review. 105
Such interpretations infringe on the power of the legislative and
executive branches to make and determine policy, and encourage
an independent and unaccountable branch to take on that role.
Similarly, deference promotes institutional confidence by
allowing experts to regulate. 106 Once a court determines that a
statute is ambiguous, it “ha[s] naught else to do beyond either
nakedly choosing [its] own policy preferences or assessing
whether the agency’s choice seems reasonable.” 107 The more
deference is afforded to agencies, the more expertise will be
utilized, resulting in more reasoned and precise policy
Technical decisions without the appropriate
decisions. 108
expertise are judgments built on sand that erode the potency of
the Court’s rulings. 109
Moreover, empowering agencies’ decisions also allows the
Court to give effect to Congress’s delegation of power. In this
way, the Court is acting as the “faithful agent[]” of the

See supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (reasoning that the agency or administrator’s
interpretation is entitled to deference where the “regulatory scheme is technical and
complex,” the interpretation evidences a “detailed and reasoned” consideration by
the agency, “and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”).
107
Kristin E. Hickman, The Proposed Separation of Powers Restoration Act:
Why? 41 A.B.A. SEC. OF ADMIN. L. & REG. PRAC. 7 (2016).
108
See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in
Administrative Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1097, 1141 (2015).
109
Even if the Court relied on scientists, economists, or other analysts to inform
its opinions, recreating the work of capable administrators would waste time and
taxpayer dollars.
105
106
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legislature 110 by carrying out its will to empower agencies to fill
in the gaps in legislation.
Thus, de novo review would
aggrandize judiciary discretion without any payoff for Congress
in either enhanced expertise or fidelity.
C. Reliance Interests Favor Maintaining the Deference Status
Quo
While many commentators have called for Chevron’s death
at the hands of the United States Supreme Court, 111 agencies,
lower courts, and Congress assume that deference applies to
agency decisions and act accordingly. The reliance on Chevron
extending across all branches of the federal government should
give the Court pause when it considers overruling the doctrine.
First, agencies depend on the stability of the Chevron regime
to guide their interpretations. Agency rulemakers are aware of
Chevron and consider its use more than any other tool in
drafting. 112 De novo review would result in “delay, complexity,
and uncertainty in the administrative process.” 113
Second, lower courts consistently and successfully rely on the
doctrine. While the Supreme Court applies Chevron to roughly
25% of the relevant cases, circuit courts apply Chevron to 74.8%
of interpretations. 114 At the Supreme Court level, “the Court’s
choice to apply Chevron deference, as opposed to a lessdeferential doctrine or no deference at all, does not seem to affect

110
For more on faithful agency, see John F. Manning, Textualism and the
Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001). But see Amy Coney Barrett,
Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 169 (2010) (noting
instead, judges are “faithful agents of the Constitution.”).
111
See generally Beermann, supra note 91; Cory R. Liu, Chevron’s Domain and
the Rule of Law, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 391 (2016); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining
Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of
Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239 (2002); Connor
N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An
Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 1727 (2010).
112
Walker, supra note 90 at 716, 724 (noting 94% of rule drafters knew Chevron
by name, and offering “some support for the empirical assumption that federal
agencies draft differently when they know Chevron deference applies”).
113
STAFF OF H. JUDICIARY COMM., 114TH CONG., REP. ON SEPARATION OF
POWERS RESTORATION ACT OF 2016 23–24 (Comm. Print 2016) (dissenting views)
(describing effect of de novo review as a “regulatory paralysis”).
114
Barnett & Walker, supra note 52, at 4, 29.
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the outcome of the case.” 115 By contrast, at the circuit court level,
“[t]he agency was twice as likely . . . to prevail . . . as opposed to
reviewing the interpretation de novo . . . .”116 Perhaps de novo
review would not increase the arbitrariness of Supreme Court
decisions, where the application of a deference standard does not
seem to affect the outcome of the case. However, deference
matters in lower courts, and contributes to the predictability and
consistency of decisions. Some scholars have questioned whether
it is necessary for the Supreme Court to be uniform in its own
application of Chevron and the instructions it provides to lower
courts. 117 The Supreme Court’s exceptions and inconsistent
applications trickle down to circuit courts, 118 and a doctrinal
schism would give the Supreme Court a license to arbitrarily
decide if and how Chevron applies to the few cases where it does
grant certiorai. Imposing de novo review at all levels of the
judiciary would gut lower courts of a predictable and reliable tool,
and “fix” a problem that does not exist outside of the Supreme
Court.
Third, congressional drafting depends, in part, upon
legislators relying on deference doctrines as a backdrop. Unique
among
interpretive
canons,
Congress
“consider[s]
Chevron . . . when drafting precisely because [it] understand[s]
that courts use [it].” 119 Unifying the approximately 12,000
congressional staffers to conform with the Supreme Court’s
notion of grammar canons would prove difficult. 120 Congress
exemplified its understanding of Chevron when it codified
deference standards in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”). 121 Congress set a
Skidmore-level standard for courts reviewing preemption
decisions from the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, and

115
Id. at 4. When the Court applies Chevron, the “agency win rate” is 76.2%.
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 29, at 1142. Agencies prevail 66% of the time when no
deference regime is invoked. Id.
116
Barnett & Walker, supra note 52, at 31.
117
Pierce, supra note 52, at 1314 (“Can, and should, the Supreme Court
establish for the first time a legal regime in which it tells lower courts to do as we
say and not as we do?”).
118
See Barnett & Walker, supra note 52 at 68 (“Mead’s focus on delegation and
formality, unsurprisingly, has a firm grasp on the circuit courts.”).
119
Bressman & Gluck, supra note 87, at 732.
120
Id. at 739.
121
See 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2018).
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maintained a Chevron “savings clause,” indicating Congress
acted in reliance on its assumption that courts will apply
Chevron by structuring legislation around it. 122
De novo review would reorder the logic of actors across the
entire federal government, removing a cornerstone of
administrative law that, with the exception of its use by the
Supreme Court, functions as intended. The solution to the
perceived separation of powers problem, then, is not to reject
deference, but to embrace it. If the Court shifts interpretations
towards a more nuanced understanding of the dynamic Congressagency relationship, drafters would be better able to predict how
legislation and interpretation might fare in judicial review. 123
IV. THE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER POST-ENACTMENT
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The Chevron framework already gives courts the means to
construe statutes according to the will of Congress and address
illegitimate exercises of agency authority. Chevron incorporates
some form of de novo judicial review by first discerning whether
the statute is ambiguous. 124 The United States Supreme Court,
encouraged by Justice Scalia, has increasingly taken a textualist
This method directly
approach at Chevron Step One. 125
correlates to the decline in the application of Chevron. 126
Limiting the available interpretive tools not only deprives courts
of vital context for the statute, but also impractically freezes the
statute at the time of enactment. Instead, courts should stand in
the shoes of the agency breathing life into a statute through
enforcement and undertake a more flexible statutory
interpretation.

Barnett, supra note 56.
Bressman & Gluck, supra note 87, at 766–67.
124
Emily Hammond, Four Flaws of the Proposed Separation of Powers
Restoration Act, 41 A.B.A. SEC. OF ADMIN. L. & REG. PRAC. 9 (2016).
125
See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 351, 363–65 (1994). But see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 29, at 1136 (“[T]here
can no longer be serious debate whether Supreme Court precedent instructs judges
to consider relevant legislative history in applying Chevron deference. It does.”).
126
Merrill, supra note 125, at 366. This might also account for the disparity of
application of Chevron doctrine between the Supreme Court and circuit courts.
122
123
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Chevron tells the Court to “give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.” 127 Legislative history explains the
specifically expressed will of Congress. Legislative history “can
aid the judge in understanding how the legislation’s
congressional proponents wanted the statute to work, what
problems they sought to address, [and] what purposes they
sought to achieve. . . .” 128 To prevent agency overreach and
uphold the meaning of the statute, the Court should consider
legislative history as a means to affect the will of Congress in a
way “that respects the general integrity of [congressional]
processes (while mindful of the possibilities of manipulation).” 129
Critics of using legislative history in Chevron interpretations
argue that if statutory ambiguity “signals a congressional
delegation to the agency charged with implementing the statute,
then a court’s use of legislative history to specify the terms of
that delegation—to narrow the scope of statutory discretion—
contradicts the very point of the statute.” 130 First, it is important
to acknowledge that legislative histories must be read with some
skepticism and afforded weight according to their context and
content; not all materials are of the same caliber in offering
Second, this
insight into legislative intent or purpose. 131
criticism presumes that external sources would force a judge to
read a statute more narrowly than the limits of each word as
explored through textualism. That idea is undermined by the
Court’s current use of textualism to “reduc[e] the range of
possible statutory meanings, and thus reduc[e] the occasions on

Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 35 (Oxford University Press,
2014) (“Legislative history can be especially valuable when construing a specialized
term or phrase in statutes dealing with complex matters beyond the ordinary ken of
the judge.”).
129
Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain
Political History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 266 (1998) (arguing that legislative
histories are critical to the interpretive process).
130
John F. Manning, Chevron and Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1517, 1542 (2014). For a general overview of criticisms of the use of legislative
histories, see KATZMANN, supra note 128, at 39–42.
131
See James J. Brudney, Lecture, Faithful Agency Versus Ordinary Meaning
Advocacy, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 975, 993 (2013) (“[S]tanding committee and
conference
committee
reports
traditionally
are
accorded
the
most
weight . . . . Explanatory floor statements by bill or amendment sponsors receive
almost as much attention . . . . Conversely, the Court considers statements by bill
opponents and also subsequent legislative history to be unreliable.”).
127
128
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which reference to agency views is appropriate.” 132 Third,
agencies themselves rely on legislative history in developing
their interpretations. 133 While some might argue that the Court
and agencies operate in “divergent normative contexts” and thus
necessarily rely on different sources of authority in their
interpretations, 134 it does not benefit the reviewing court to
foreclose interpretive resources available to and utilized by the
agency when determining whether the agency is acting within its
scope of authority. Finally, this criticism ignores the possibility
that the Court could use legislative history to corroborate, not
foreclose, the ambiguity of a statute.
Post-enactment legislative history in particular is critical to
agency-related statutory interpretation where agencies receive
signals from and construe statutes in accordance with the
preferences of the current, not the enacting, Congress. 135 While
post-enactment legislative history could be an important
interpretive tool, the Court, in most instances, currently rejects
it. 136
Subsequent legislative history has two main forms:
congressional resolutions and legislative acquiescence.
The
137
Court largely ignores resolutions, which are meant to influence
political actors with a majority vote of one or both houses of
Without bicameralism and presentment—
Congress. 138
significantly, the signature of the head of all executive agencies—
resolutions are particularly susceptible to partisan politics, and

Merrill, supra note 125, at 366.
Supra note 112 and accompanying text.
134
Jerry Mashaw, Exploring Agency Statutory Interpretation, 31 A.B.A. SEC. OF
ADMIN. L. & REG. PRAC. 7 (2006) (“Courts have long been viewed as rightsprotecting, institutional brakes, while executive agencies are institutional
accelerators.”).
135
See supra Part III.A.
136
See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 298 (1995); Haynes v. United States,
390 U.S. 85, 87 n.4 (1968) (“The view of a subsequent Congress of course provide
[sic] no controlling basis from which to infer the purposes of an earlier Congress.”);
Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61
STAN. L. REV. 573, 609 (2008) (“[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.” (quoting United States v.
Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960))).
137
See, Gersen & Posner, supra note 136, at 609–10. Because courts do discern
post-enactment legislative intent from congressional resolutions, Congress does not
often utilize them. Id. at 612.
138
Id. at 578–79.
132
133

AR2_BALDWIN

114

9/10/2018 12:41 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:91

are therefore not regarded as trustworthy indicators of legislative
intent. 139
By contrast, the Court sometimes pays credence to
legislative acquiescence, “a presumption about legislative views
on the basis of congressional inaction or congressional action that
has multiple interpretations.” 140 This presumption is strongest
when Congress’s inaction follows vigorous debate by Congress
and the public, and where “there is reason to regard the failure of
the legislature to act as evidence of the correctness of the
interpretation.” 141 Saliently, Congress pays close attention to
statutory interpretation in civil rights cases, and is more likely to
exercise “restorative overrides,” where it “ ‘restores’ what it
considers the correct understanding of the statutory
scheme . . . . ” 142 In essence, acquiescence allows an agency’s
prior interpretation to gain deferential status in the event
Congress does not take affirmative legislative action to abrogate
the agency’s reading as affirmed by the Court.
Critics of acquiescence argue that “inaction does not contain
the same guaranties as action.” 143 Congress could fail to enact a
statute for any number of reasons that do not indicate its
Additionally, some
approval of a given interpretation. 144
standards for applying acquiescence are ambiguous.
For
example, it is unclear when an interpretation becomes
“longstanding,” and how rigorously a topic should be debated
before the Court is comfortable allowing the absence of action to
See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of
Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1523 n.304 (2000) (noting that because
the bill passage process encourages some degree of partisan restraint, by
comparison, “[p]ost-enactment legislative history seems especially likely to be
strategic rather than truly descriptive of congressional intent”).
140
Gersen & Posner, supra note 136, at 610.
141
Jill Schlick, Administrative Law—The Fourth Circuit Strikes Down the
FDA’s Tobacco Regulations, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 741, 754–55 (1999).
142
Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional
Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 1317, 1319–20 (2014) (listing as examples of restorative overrides the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 and the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009).
143
Schlick, supra note 141, at 756–57 (claiming a lack of political accountability
where Congress can change the law by doing nothing).
144
See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)
(“Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally
tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that
the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.”) (internal
quotations omitted).
139
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stand in for Congress’s will. 145 These blurry boundaries could
have the unintended effect of allowing courts to manipulate the
tool in conformity with their own intent, rather than Congress’s.
Nevertheless, the benefits of utilizing acquiescence to
determine intent outweigh the drawbacks. Acquiescence would
increase, not decrease, political accountability by burdening
legislators with the duty to respond to interpretations.
Moreover, a widespread use of this presumption, like a
widespread use of deference, creates a predictable backdrop for
legislators and agencies alike. 146 Legislators understand the
consequences of failing to abrogate interpretations with which
they disagree, and can measure their responses accordingly.
Agencies, knowing that they are more likely to prevail in their
interpretation the longer it is utilized without contest, might
cater policies toward a longer aim, potentially with a more
restrained effect that Congress would find less incendiary.
To illustrate this point, the following analysis applies postenactment legislative history to Zarda to reimagine the strength
of the agency deference argument the Second Circuit avoided. At
the outset, given the evolution of Civil Rights Act jurisprudence,
it strains credulity to assert that the term “sex” in Title VII is
unambiguous on its face. 147 Here, Chevron Step One requires a
searching inquiry to define the outer boundaries of that
ambiguity. The scant legislative history that accompanies this
act is not illuminating. 148 Using post-enactment legislative
history, the court would focus its Step One analysis on Congress’s
dynamic interpretation of Title VII, looking for any indication

145
See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 1823, 1864–65 (2015) (advocating to define longstanding as at
least ten years because it requires the interpretation to be on the books for more
than one presidential administration).
146
See supra Part III.C.
147
See Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 386 (2015)
(acknowledging the EEOC changed its construction of “sex” to include gender
identity since plaintiff filed the case, and remanding to the District Court to assess
the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (allowing a claim for same-sex
harassment under Title VII); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)
(recognizing a Title VII claim on the basis of sex for discrimination for failure to
conform to sex stereotypes).
148
See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986) (describing the
last-minute amendment that added “sex” to Title VII, leaving interpreters with
“little legislative history to guide us”).
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that once Congress was apprised of the EEOC’s definition
inclusive of sexual orientation, it reacted with legislative action
to narrow the definition of sex.
Congress may have been aware of the interpretation of sex
as sexual orientation as early as 2002, when a federal district
court in Oregon held that “[t]he protections of Title VII are not
limited to heterosexual employees only” where a lesbian woman
stated a claim for sexual harassment based on nonconformity to
gender stereotypes. 149 At the very least, Congress should have
recognized the EEOC’s interpretation of “sex” in 2015, when it
decided Baldwin v. Foxx. 150 In 2003, the Supreme Court began
weaving a tapestry of protection in sexual orientation
discrimination cases. 151
Congress must have noticed the
evolution of the status quo on the Court and in society towards a
more inclusive definition, which would necessarily alert Congress
to the opportunity to abrogate a broader interpretation.
In light of the legal and cultural focus on LGBTQ rights, it is
without question that the public has engaged in vigorous debate
on the issue of sexual orientation discrimination. Congress has
definitively joined the fray, as evidenced by a recent proposal for
sweeping legislation to address LGBTQ rights and protections. 152
While the Second Circuit dismisses arguments advocating for
subsequent legislative developments put forward by amici, 153 it
only cites to the Department of Justice’s argument that the
consistent introduction and failure of legislation that “expressly
prohibit[s] sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace
[means that] Congress has implicitly ratified decisions holding
that sexual orientation was not covered by Title VII.” 154 Far from
seeking to reassert a contrary definition, Congress sought to
explicitly codify the EEOC’s interpretation of “sex” in the

149
Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (D.
Or. 2002).
150
Supra note 10 and accompanying text.
151
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor,
570 U.S. 744 (2013); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 349–50
(7th Cir. 2017) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). See also Zarda v.
Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15–3775 slip op., at 66 n.33 (2d Cir, Feb. 26, 2018) (en
banc) (“[T]here has been a sea change in constituional framework governing samesex marriage.”).
152
See Equality Act, H.R. 2282, 115th Cong. (2017).
153
Zarda, slip op., at 59.
154
Id. at 62.
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proposed Equality Act using a “belt and suspenders” method. 155
The bill’s 240 co-sponsors reiterate the new status quo of broad
inclusion of LGBTQ rights in existing legislation, 156 showing that
Congress is an active partner in continuously reshaping
background norms. Instead of “ratif[ying] by silence” 157 and
interepretation that precludes Title VII protection for gay
workers, Congress evinces a robust rights-protective purpose in
their consistent attempts to offer coverage to gay employees. In
its most recent iteration, Congress’s underwriting of an agency
decision shows harmony and alignment of interpretation in both
policy-making branches, a persuasive statement that bolsters
deference to the EEOC decision. 158 Should the Equality Act fail,
it is unlikely that the EEOC’s new definition of sex, adjudicated
in 2015, will be “longstanding” enough to merit accepting
Congress’s silence as action for the decision before the Second
Circuit. 159 However, given the intensity of public attention and
debate, a court might accept a shorter timeframe, combined with
the fact that the only proposed legislation reacting to the EEOC’s
interpretation sought to codify Baldwin as sufficient to evince
ambiguity.
Once the reviewing court finds an ambiguity left to the
agency to construe, it then looks to the reasonableness of the
agency’s interpretation.
In Baldwin, the EEOC held that
“[d]iscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is premised on
sex-based preferences, assumptions, expectations, stereotypes, or

Equality Act, H.R. 2282, 115th Cong. § 2(a)(9) (2017); Brief Amici Curiae of
Four Members of Congress in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 11–
12, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2017) (No. 15-3775).
156
See Lopez, supra note 13. Certainly, this bill cannot represent the unanimous
will of Congress, nor is it enacted law.
157
Zarda, slip op., at 63.
158
See Ethan J. Lieb & James J. Brudney, Legislative Underwrites, 103 VA. L.
REV 1487, 1491, 1498–99 (2017) (describing “an express legislative endorsement of a
judicial reading of a statute” as potentially a form of “supercharged precedent,” but
acknowledging that while “[o]ne can certainly make a case for considering
underwites of agency decisions,” including adjudications, the additional complexities
of that endeavor are beyond the scope of that Article).
159
The EEOC may, however, be able to assert acquiescence for an eventual
Supreme Court case, assuming its definition remains consistent. The Chevron Court
accounted for an agency’s changing policy priorities, and accepted that
interpretations would not remain fixed over time. See Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
155
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norms,” 160 placing it squarely within prior precedent disallowing
discrimination for nonconformity with gender stereotypes. The
EEOC also analogized sexual orientation discrimination to the
long-standing protection against discrimination of individuals in
interracial relationships. 161 Moreover, while the 1964 Congress
might not have intended for Title VII to protect sexual
orientation, the EEOC noted that “statutory prohibitions often go
beyond the principal evil [they were passed to combat] to cover
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions
of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators
by which we are governed.” 162 Based on this expert analysis that
benefitted from decades of the EEOC’s administering Title VII
and broad national perspective on discrimination in the
workplace, the EEOC should not only be permitted to reasonably
evolve the definition of the statutes it enforces, but also be
afforded deference for its decisions. As such, the Second Circuit
should overturn its prior caselaw and adopt the EEOC’s
interpretation of “sex” as inclusive of sexual orientation.
Where, as here, post-enactment legislative history evinces
agreement among Congress and an agency on a permissible
interpretation of a pre-existing statute, that definition should
stand.
Legislative history, including subsequent legislative
acquiescence to agency interpretation, promotes a stable and
consistent administrative state by placing policy decisions in the
hands of politically accountable actors. 163
CONCLUSION
A stronger deference doctrine will increase predictability in
the promulgation of laws and uniformity in their enforcement.
Furthermore, Chevron is the single most recognizable doctrine in
administrative law, and legislators and interpreters, including
Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5
(July 16, 2015).
161
Id. at *6 (“[A]n employment action based on an employee’s relationship with
a person of another race necessarily involves considerations of the employee’s
race. . . .”).
162
Id. at *9 (quoting Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79
(1998)).
163
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret
Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 417 (arguing that society needs “predictability,
expertise, and democratic legitimacy” for a successful legal system).
160
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circuit courts, rely on deference to inform their work. A
consistent application of Chevron doctrine emboldened by an
expanded use of legislative histories will unify methodologies of
statutory interpretation to help to eliminate the politicization of
judicial opinions in administrative law.
Without agency deference, LGBTQ employees like Donald
Zarda will not know if they have protection from being fired for
their sexual indentity. Their protection in the workplace may
vary from state to state, as judges displace the well-reasoned
interpretation offered by the agency charged with administering
Title VII legislation. Even where the Second Circuit found a
rights-protective doctrine within Supreme Court precedent of
analogous cases, its repeated reliance on the framework and
argument of the EEOC decision without explicitly crediting its
persuasive or deferential value undermines the credibility and
transparency of the judiciary and risks the perception that
politics drove its decision.
Supporters of SOPRA are willing to exchange limited agency
power for enhanced judicial activism, an opposite but not equal
strain on separation of powers. It is not sufficient to claim that
the President does not exercise sufficient oversight over
administrative agencies to count them as democratically
accountable. By comparison, judges have practically no oversight
and a lifetime tenure. Additionally, a President’s use of agencies
to promote a specific agenda is not a per se violation of
separation of powers. Finally, though SOPRA claims that de
novo review would force tighter legislative drafting, there is no
indication that Chevron doctrine was promoting sloppy
legislating. Indeed, even with the most careful drafting, losing
the ability to know how a statute would be interpreted and to
what extent it would withstand scrutiny would be akin to losing
the ability to know if coming out puts one out of a job. Neither
are for the judge alone to decide.

